

## **Certification Report**

### **Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0**

Sponsor and developer: Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co.,Ltd.

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**Peoples Republic of China** 

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The Netherlands



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### **Foreword**

The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.

Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 "General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories".

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.

The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the (site) security target.

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### Recognition of the Certificate

The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating nations.

### International recognition

The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC\_FLR.

For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see <a href="http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org">http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org</a>.

### **European recognition**

The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS MRA in December 2010.

For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see <a href="https://www.sogis.eu">https://www.sogis.eu</a>.



### 1 Executive Summary

This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0. The developer of the Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0 is Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co.,Ltd. located in ZheJiang, Peoples Republic of China and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.

The TOE is a Network camera device composed of hardware and firmware and provides video and configuration management functions.

The TOE can be divided into two categories: IPC and dome camera. The biggest difference between IPC and dome camera is that the dome camera has PTZ (Pan/Tilt/Zoom) function, while IPC does not.

The usage environment of TOE is a segregated LAN, optionally connected to Internet, which may include one or more TOE devices, video storage devices (such as NVR, DVR, etc.), PC hosts supporting a web browser, hosts supporting the installation of TOE management software and TOE

The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft | Amsterdam. The evaluation was completed on 22 December 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] <sup>1</sup> for this product provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL3 augmented (EAL3+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC\_FLR.2 (Flaw Reporting Procedures).

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).

TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.

The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator, and is not available for public review.



### 2 Certification Results

### 2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0 from Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co.,Ltd. located in ZheJiang, Peoples Republic of China.

The TOE is comprised of the following main components:

Delivery item type	Identifier	Version
Hardware	IPC 5 Series devices	See [ST] section 1.4.1.1 for the list of hardware models and their versions.
	IPC 3 Series (1) devices	See [ST] section 1.4.1.2 for the list of hardware models and their versions.
	IPC 3 Series (2) devices	See [ST] section 1.4.1.3 for the list of hardware models and their versions.
	IPC 3 Series (3) devices	See [ST] section 1.4.1.4 for the list of hardware models and their versions.
	Dome SD5A Series devices	See [ST] section 1.4.1.5 for the list of hardware models and their versions.
	Dome SDT5X Series devices	See [ST] section 1.4.1.6 for the list of hardware models and their versions.
Software	IPC 5 Series File: DH_IPC-HX5XXX Volt_MultiLang_PN_Stream3_V2.820.19EL001 .0.R.220630.zip	V2.820.19EL001.0.R Build Date: 2022-06-30
	IPC 3 Series (1) File: DH_IPC-HX3XXX- Leo_MultiLang_PN_Stream3_V2.800.19EL002 .0.R.220715.zip	V2.800.19EL002.0.R, Build Date: 2022-07-15
	IPC 3 Series (2) DH_IPC-HX5(4)(3)XXX- Leo_MultiLang_PN_Stream3_V2.800.19EL002 .0.R.220715.zip	V2.800.19EL002.0.R, Build Date: 2022-07-15
	IPC 3 Series (3) DH_IPC-HX3XXX- Dalton_MultiLang_PN_Stream3_V2.820.19EL0 02.0.R.220630.zip	V2.820.19EL002.0.R, Build Date: 2022-06-30
	SD5A Series File: General_SD- Prometheus_MultiLang_PN_Stream3_V2.810. 1A6W000.0.R.220630.zip	V2.810.1A6W000.0.R, Build Date: 2022-06-30
	SDT5X Series File: DH_SD-Fafnir_MultiLang_PN_Stream3- LingxiV2_V2.810.1A6W000.0.R.220630.zip	V2.810.1A6W000.0.R, Build Date: 2022-06-30

To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0. For details, see section 2.5 "Documentation" of this report.

### 2.2 Security Policy

The TOE has the following features:

Audit Logs



- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- Trusted Path/Channels
- Trusted Firmware Updates
- TOE Access
- Cryptographic Support.

### 2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

### 2.3.1 Assumptions

The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].


### 2.3.2 Clarification of scope

The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.

#### 2.4 Architectural Information

The TOE is a Network camera device composed of hardware and firmware and provides video and configuration management functions.

The TOE can be divided into two categories: IPC and dome camera. The biggest difference between IPC and dome camera is that the dome camera has PTZ (Pan/Tilt/Zoom) function, while IPC does not The logical architecture can be depicted as follows:



#### 2.5 Documentation

The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:



Identifier	Version
Dahua Network Camera Series AGD_OPE	V1.0
Dahua Network Camera Series AGD_PRE	V1.3
Dahua Product Security Hardening Guide	V2.0.3
Dahua Network Camera Web 3.0 Operation Manual	V2.1.1
Dahua Dual-PTZ Camera Web 3.0 User's Manual	V1.1.1
Network Speed Dome & PTZ Camera Web 3.0 User's Manual	V3.0.1

### 2.6 IT Product Testing

Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.

#### 2.6.1 Testing approach and depth

The evaluator repeated a representative part of the developer tests for each different firmware. The set of repeated tests, consisting of two tests for each interface, was repeated for all the models.

In addition, the evaluator devised additional independent evaluator tests to provide further assurance of the functional security.

These focussed on correct installation of certifications, network interface and network port scanning, management interface, checking for known vulnerabilities and verification of the logged data structure.

#### 2.6.2 Independent penetration testing

The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 6 weeks. During that test campaign, 100% of the total time was spent on logical tests.

### 2.6.3 Test configuration

The configuration of the samples used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was the same as described in the [ST].

#### 2.6.4 Test results

The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the *[ETR]*, with references to the documents containing the full details.

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.

No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.

#### 2.7 Reused Evaluation Results

There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.

#### 2.8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0.

#### 2.9 Evaluation Results

The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.



The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is "Pass".

Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Dahua Network Camera Series Version 1.0, to be **CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant**, and to meet the requirements of **EAL 3 augmented with ALC\_FLR.2**. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].

#### 2.10 Comments/Recommendations

The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 "Documentation" contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE.

In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols and implementations: None.



# 3 Security Target

The Dahua EAL3+ Network Camera Series Security Target, Version 2.7, 18 November 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.

### 4 Definitions

This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:

IT Information Technology

ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility

JIL Joint Interpretation Library

NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security

PP Protection Profile
PTZ Pan/Tilt/Zoom

TOE Target of Evaluation



# 5 Bibliography

This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report.

[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and

III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017

[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,

Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017

[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Dahua Network Camera Series – EAL3+, 22-RPT-

1157, Version 3.0, 19 December 2023

[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,

28 March 2019

[ST] Dahua EAL3+ Network Camera Series Security Target, Version 2.7, 18

November 2022

(This is the end of this report.)